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ABSTRACT
The usage of mobile banking and in particular,
payments by means of mobile phones, has increased in
recent years in South Africa, with consequent impacts from
a legal and regulatory point of view. South Africa is a
developing economy with a large “unbanked” sector. That
is, a large segment of the population does not have bank
accounts and “banking” happens through informal means.
This Article deals with the legal and regulatory framework
pertaining to mobile money and examines issues relating to
financial integrity and financial inclusion as they present
themselves in South Africa. The author states that the
regulatory framework in South Africa is not entirely
conducive to greater financial inclusion and argues for a
better balance between the regulation of risk and access to
the payment system through an enhanced implementation
of a risk-based approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Mobile banking, and consequently, mobile payments and
mobile money are the latest in a myriad of emerging technological
innovations in the banking industry. The usage of mobile banking
and in particular, payments by means of mobile phones, have
increased in recent years in South Africa, with consequent impacts
from a legal and regulatory point of view.
South Africa is a developing economy with a large “unbanked”
sector. That is, a large segment of the population does not have
bank accounts and “banking” happens through informal means. It
also appears from latest figures that the penetration level of South
Africans with mobile phones is increasing, yet the regulatory
framework is not entirely conducive to greater financial inclusion.
This Article seeks to examine the legal and regulatory framework
pertaining to mobile money and examines issues relating to
financial integrity and financial inclusion as they present
themselves in South Africa. Regulatory gaps and areas for
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improvement are highlighted. The author argues for a more
flexible approach to regulation in South Africa to enhance
financial inclusion through the use of mobile money there.
I. DEFINITION OF MOBILE MONEY
Before one could understand the term “mobile money,” it is
necessary to understand associated terms that may have bearing on
the definition of mobile money. As a form of e-banking, 1 “mbanking” is defined as “financial services delivered via mobile
networks and performed on a mobile phone. These services may or
may not be defined as banking services by the regulator, depending
on the legislation of the country in question, as well as on which
services are offered.” 2
“Mobile money” or “m-money” is a form of electronic money
and refers to services that connect consumers financially through
mobile phones. Mobile money allows for any mobile phone
subscriber—whether banked or unbanked—to deposit value into
their mobile account, send value via a simple handset to another
mobile subscriber, and allow the recipient to turn that value back
into cash easily and cheaply. 3 In this way, m-money can be used
for both mobile money transfers 4 and mobile payments. 5 Mobile
1

E-banking is the use of electronic delivery channels for banking products
and services. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS [BIS], RISK MANAGEMENT
PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTRONIC BANK 5 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs82.pdf.
2
Lennart Bångens & Björn Söderberg, Mobile Banking – Financial
Services for the Unbanked? 14 (Swedish Program for ICT in Dev. Regions,
2008), available at http://www.spidercenter.org/sites/default/files/Mobile%
20banking%20-%20financial%20services%20for%20the%20unbanked.pdf. For
the most recent publication, see PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING
MOBILE MONEY AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIMES: GLOBAL POLICY CHANGES AND
SOLUTIONS (2011).
3
COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. [CPSS], BIS, SURVEY OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN ELECTRONIC MONEY AND INTERNET AND MOBILE PAYMENTS
4 (2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss62.pdf.
4
“Mobile money transfers” are international remittances using mobile
phones. For more detail, see CPSS & THE WORLD BANK, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
FOR INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE SERVICES 2 (2007), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAYMENTREMMITTANCE/Resources
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money transfers are thus included in the definition of mobile
money for the purposes of this Article.
II. MOBILE MONEY IN SOUTH AFRICA
Mobile banking has been increasing in South Africa. Several
initiatives have emerged for initiating payments from mobile
phones by using short messaging services (SMS) or phone calls.
Some products use the phone as an access channel through existing
bank accounts or payment cards. Meanwhile, other products allow
customers to pay using prepaid value stored on their mobile phone
or to pay afterwards, where payment for goods or services are
additional items on the customer’s phone bill or through the use of
Near Field Communication (NFC) technology. However, this
system was only piloted once within a closed system during a
music festival called “Oppikoppi” and on a trial basis by ABSA
employees. 6
Initially the four major banks in South Africa were given a
wake-up call with the emergence of then-new kid on the block,
WIZZIT. 7 However, it is apparent that it is now the four biggest
/New_Remittance_Report.pdf. See also Simbarashe Mbalekwa, The Legal and
Regulatory Aspects of International Remittances Within the SADC Region (Jan.
2011) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, Nelson Mandela Metro. Univ.),
available
at
http://www.nmmu.ac.za/documents/theses/SIMBARASHE%
20MBALEKWA.pdf.
5
“Mobile payments” refer to the provision of payment services through the
use of mobile phones, mostly electronic funds transfer between a customer’s
own accounts, transfers to a third party (beneficiary), or would be mobile
money. A mobile payment may also refer to the process of two parties
exchanging financial value using a mobile device in return for goods and
services. See Elham Ramezani, Mobile Payment 4 (June 17, 2008) (term paper,
Hochschule Furtwangen Univ.), available at http://webuser.hs-furtwangen.de/
~heindl/ebte-08-ss-mobile-payment-Ramezani.pdf.
6
Jan Vermeulen, Oppikoppi to go Cash Free in 2011, MYBROADBAND
(July 2, 2011), http://mybroadband.co.za/news/general/28051-oppikoppi-to-gocash-free-in-2011.html; Media Release, ABSA Bank, Cellphones as Payment
Devices (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.absa.co.za/Absacoza/MediaCentre/Press-Statements/Cellphones-as-payment-devices.
7
WIZZIT is the brain-child of Brian Richardson. It has a strategy of
getting into South African townships using “whizz kids” to sign up users to open
bank accounts. MTN Banking is a joint venture between MTN and Standard
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commercial banks (Nedbank, First National Bank, Standard Bank,
and ABSA) that are the providers of mobile banking services in
South Africa through joint ventures with mobile technology
companies and retailers. For example, Nedbank and mobile
operator Vodacom teamed up to launch M-PESA, a solution that
enables person-to-person money transfers via mobile phone, even
between persons without bank accounts. This followed the
Standard Bank’s launch of a similar product, called “Instant
Money,” a joint venture between the bank and local retailer Spar.
Standard Bank also has a joint venture company called “Oltio”
between itself and pan-African mobile network operator MTN,
which, through its “payD” platform enables customers to purchase
products and services online and use their debit cards to pay for the
purchase while making use of their mobile phones to enter their
personal identification numbers (PINs). First National Bank also
entered the fray, launching its “e-Wallet” mobile money transfer
solution, which allows customers to send money to anyone in
South Africa with a valid mobile phone number. Finally, as stated
previously, ABSA Bank conducted South Africa’s first live user
trial of NFC technology on mobile phones, in a partnership with
MasterCard, to embed the “Paypass Tap and Go” payment chip on
mobile handsets for the trial. This enabled customers to load funds
onto their phones through the ABSA website or ATMs and then to
pay for goods or services by merely holding their phones in front
of NFC-enabled pay points. The value of their transactions is then
immediately debited from their stored value. 8
Bank of South Africa. MTN simply requires a SMS that the user provides an ID
number and make a follow-up call to start an account-opening procedure that
includes voice recognition technology. FNB Mobile at one stage in 2005 signed
up 130,000 customers in six months. WIZZIT was developed to operate even in
older phones and is not confined to any mobile telecommunications network. It
“piggybacks” on the banking license of Bank of Athens, a registered branch of a
foreign banking institution. See Maya Fisher-French, Talking ‘Bout a
Revolution, MAVERICK MAGAZINE, Nov. 3, 2005, at 34, available at
http://www.wizzit.co.za/media/revolution.pdf.
8
For more detail, see the websites of the four commercial banks: FIRST
NAT’L
BANK,
http://www.fnb.co.za;
STANDARD
BANK,
http://www.standardbank.co.za; ABSA BANK, http://www.absa.co.za; and
NEDBANK, www.nedbank.co.za (all websites last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
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Mobile devices are well positioned for making payments
because the penetration level of digital mobile phones is higher in
South Africa than that of computers. Latest figures from Wide
World Worx suggest that in 2009 South Africa had a mobile
penetration level of about 10.8 percent, which amounted to
5,300,000 users out of a population of 49,052,489. 9
It is interesting that, even though the use of Internet services
has exploded in South Africa, less than half of urban mobile phone
users who have Internet-enabled phones use the Internet. As many
as 9,500,000 South Africans are able to browse the Internet on
their phones. 10 If they use the Internet, the figure of World Wide
Worx would almost double to 9,600,000. 11 The potential thus
clearly exists for a higher penetration level with respect to Internetenabled payments through the use of a mobile phone.
It is also interesting to note the inroads that have been made to
increase the level of banked South Africans. Between 1993 and
2009, the number of banked South Africans increased remarkably,
especially in the black ethnic group. This increase has largely been
due to easier access to banking services being provided to people
living in informal urban areas and to those earning less than
ZAR2,000 a month. The driving force behind the substantial
increase was the South African government policy on economic
empowerment and the inclusion of targets in the Financial Sector
Charter, which led to a proliferation of products and services
offered, such as “Mzanzi accounts,” ATM cards, debit/check cards,
credit cards, savings and transaction accounts, as well as mobile
banking. 12 Nonetheless, a significant portion of the black
population is still unbanked. 13
9

South Africa Internet Usage, Population, Broadband and Market Report,
INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.co./af/za.htm (last
visited Aug. 25, 2012).
10
Ian Mansfield, Mobile Internet Usage Booms in South Africa, CELLULAR
NEWS (May 27, 2010), http://www.cellular-news.com/story/43524.php.
11
Id.
12
For more detail, see GLOBAL P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION [GPFI], GLOBAL
STANDARD SETTING BODIES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011), available at
http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/Global%20Standard%20Settin
g%20Bodies%20and%20FI.pdf.
13
For more detail, see FINMARK TRUST, FINSCOPE SOUTH AFRICA (2009),
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III. FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILE MONEY
The regulatory stance in South Africa has mostly been with
reference to electronic money, a subset of e-banking. The legal and
regulatory framework with regards to e-banking would apply to
mobile banking. In South Africa the legal framework is comprised
of the following:


South African Reserve Bank Act (Act 89 of 1990);



National Payment System Act (Act 78 of 1998);



Banks Act (Act 90 of 1994);



Exchange Control Regulations (if cross-border);



Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Act 38 of 2001); and



South African Reserve Bank Position Paper on Electronic
Money. 14
A. The National Payment System (NPS)

Payment systems are critical to the effective functioning of
financial systems in a country and globally. 15 If a payment system
is insufficiently protected against risks such as credit, liquidity, and
available at http://www.finscope.co.za/documents/2009/Brochure_SA09.pdf.
See also Press Release, FinMark Trust & TNS Research Surveys, South Africa
in
Black
and
White
(Jan.
2009),
available
at
http://www.tnsresearchsurveys.co.za/news-centre/pdf/2009/Fin08FaceofSA.pdf.
14
S. AFR. RESERVE BANK, POSITION PAPER ON ELECTRONIC MONEY (2009),
available
at
http://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/
NationalPaymentSystem(NPS)/Legal/Documents/Position%20Paper/PP2009_01
.pdf [hereinafter POSITION PAPER].
15
The payment system can also be described as the “essential oil that
lubricates the economy.” Stefan Gannon, Weaving Nets to Catch the Wind: The
Legal and Regulatory Issues Concerning the Development of Robust and
Efficient International Electronic Financial Infrastructure, 33 COMM. L. WORLD
REV. 352, 353 (2004).
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settlement risks, disruption within the system could trigger or
transmit further disruptions among its participants, or generate
systemic disruptions in the financial markets or more widely across
the economy. This phenomenon is referred to as “systemic risk.” 16
A fundamental requirement for a stable and secure payment
system is that it should operate in a well-defined legal
environment, setting out the rights and obligations of each party
involved in effecting a payment through the system. 17 It is for this
very reason that Core Principle I of the Core Principles for
Systemically Important Payment Systems published by the
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the BIS
provides that the legal basis for payments should be well defined. 18
The ambit of the South African NPS has been confirmed by the
Reserve Bank in its recently released National Payment System
Framework and Strategy Vision 2015. 19
16

The generally accepted terminology used to describe these risks are
derived from CPSS, BIS, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN PAYMENTS AND
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
cpss00b.pdf.
17
This is to guard against “legal risk.” “Legal risk” is defined by the BIS as
“the risk of loss because of the unexpected application of a law or regulation or
because a contract cannot be enforced.” See id. at 29.
18
It states that “the system should have a well founded legal basis under all
relevant jurisdictions.” CPSS, BIS, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT PAYMENT SYSTEMS 6 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/cpss43.pdf.
19
S. AFR. RESERVE BANK, NATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND
STRATEGY: VISION 2015 9 (2011), available at http://www.resbank.co.za/
RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(NPS)/Documents/Overvie
w/Vision2015.pdf. The ambit of the NPS or “payment system” is described in
the S. AFR. RESERVE BANK, NATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND
STRATEGY: VISION 2010 11 (2006), available at http://www.resbank.co.za/
RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(NPS)/Documents/Overvie
w/Vision2010.pdf:
The oversight domain of the NPS entails the entire process of
making payment. In other words, it entails the process
(including but not limited to) that enables the payer to make a
payment . . . the payer to issue a payment instruction via a
payment instrument or other infrastructure, the institution to
receive the payment instruction via clearing or otherwise, the
process of clearing and settlement (where applicable), the
beneficiary to accept the payment instruction, the beneficiary
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B. Oversight of the NPS
The Reserve Bank, as a neutral agent, is best suited to oversee
and supervise the NPS. Section 10(1)(c) of the South African
Reserve Bank Act enables the Reserve Bank to establish, operate,
oversee, and regulate payment, clearing, and settlement systems.
This power is reaffirmed in Section 2 of the National Payment
System Act. 20
Besides the general powers of oversight in terms of Section
10(1)(c) of the Reserve Bank Act as mentioned above, the Reserve
Bank has the power to issue directives, 21 in consultation with the
to deliver the payment instruction to an institution for
collection, the institution to receive and deliver the payment
collection into clearing and settlement, and the beneficiary to
receive the benefit of the payment. Within the described
process, banks, third-person payment providers, system
operators, PCH system operators [PCH refers to a “payment
clearing house”] and agents of payers and/or beneficiaries are
included.
20
Nat’l Payment Sys. Act 78 of 1998 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(
NPS)/Legal/Documents/NPS%20Act.pdf [hereinafter NPS Act]. The National
Payment System Department of the Reserve Bank performs the oversight of
payments in South Africa. In terms of Section 3 of the Banks Act, the Registrar
of Banks supervises the banking industry. The Registrar performs this function,
in conjunction with the Bank Supervision Department of the Reserve Bank.
Depending on the type of banking product that a bank wishes to offer, oversight
would fall into the domain of either of these departments, sometimes into both.
For example, there is no provision in the Banks Act that prevents a bank from
setting up mobile banking. However, if mobile payments are offered, the matter
would fall within the ambit of the National Payment System Department
(NPSD), because the provision of these services may pose systemic or other
risks which may threaten the stability of and confidence in, the National
Payment System. For more detail on the South African NPS, see Vivienne
Lawack-Davids, The Legal and Regulatory Framework of the National Payment
System (NPS) – Peeling the Layers of the Onion, 29 OBITER 453 (2008).
21
Directives issued in consultation with the payment system management
body terms of Subsection 1 are “general directives,” as opposed to the “remedial
directives” which the Reserve Bank may issue in terms of Subsection 3.
Provision is made for the cancellation of previously issued directives and an
offense in Subsection 3. See NPS Act §§ 12(3), (5), (6), (8).
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payment system management body and other stakeholders (Section
12(1)). 22 The Reserve Bank has to date issued three directives, to
wit, in respect of banks involved in the collection of payment
instructions in the early debit order of Payment Clearing Houses
(PCHs), 23 in respect of system operators, 24 and in respect of
payments to third persons, 25 but no directives dealing with mmoney or m-payments.
Furthermore, the Reserve Bank sometimes issues Position
Papers to clarify its regulatory stance. Although Position Papers do
not have the same legal binding power as directives, they are
usually followed because of the Reserve Bank’s moral persuasion
powers. In addition, if the Reserve Bank is so inclined, it may issue
a special directive aligned with its stance in the Position Paper that
must be complied with, otherwise the Reserve Bank may apply to
the High Court for an order to direct such person to comply with
the directive issued.
“Mobile money” is defined in the 2009 Position Paper as:
[M]onetary value represented by a claim on the
issuer. This money is stored electronically and
issued on receipt of funds, is generally accepted as a
means of payment by persons other than the issuer
and is redeemable for physical cash or a deposit into
a bank account on demand. 26
22

It is an offense to fail, refuse, or neglect to comply with directives and a
person who is found guilty of such an offense is liable to a fine of ZAR1 million
or to imprisonment or to both a fine and imprisonment. No directives issued will
have retroactive effect. Provision is also made for a grace period in respect of
“general directives,” as opposed to “remedial directives” which will become
effective immediately. See id. at § 12(9).
23
See NPS Act Directive 2 of 2006 (S. Afr).
24
See NPS Act Directive 2 of 2007 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(
NPS)/Legal/Documents/Directives/D2_2007(SysOp).pdf.
25
See NPS Act Directive 1 of 2007 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(
NPS)/Legal/Documents/Directives/D1_2007(ThirdParty).pdf.
26
POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 3. The Reserve Bank initially issued a
Position Paper on mobile money in 1999. This Position Paper was amended in
2006 and subsequently again in 2009.
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Having “money” stored on a mobile phone could satisfy the
definition of “mobile money” since it is monetary value
represented by a claim on the issuer, it is stored electronically (on
the mobile phone), it is issued on receipt of funds (to the issuer),
and may be redeemed for physical cash or deposited into a bank
account. However, one could argue that at this stage, mobile
payments, while growing, would not be “generally accepted as a
means of payment by persons other than the issuer.”
The definition of e-money in the 2009 Position Paper is
different from previous definitions of mobile money in various
respects. Most notably for purposes of this Article is that the
Position Paper now states that only South African registered banks
may issue mobile money, unlike the reference in the previous
definitions of “making payments to undertakings other than the
issuer, with or without involving bank accounts in the transaction.”
With the emergence of a few non-banks, such as mobile
banking services providers and retailers, the effect is that the
normal sponsorship arrangements for clearing and settlement will
prevail. In other words, the retailer or technology company is not a
settlement system participant and needs to be sponsored by a bank
to enable clearing and settlement. 27
Viewed from the Reserve Bank’s point of view, it could be
argued that emerging e-money products may require regulatory
adjustment or intervention, which may arise from the need to:


Maintain the integrity, confidence and limit the risk in the
NPS;



Assist other regulatory authorities in providing consumers
with adequate protection from unfair practices, fraud and
financial loss; and



Assist law enforcement agencies in the prevention of
criminal activity. 28

This view is affirmed by the new Reserve Bank Payment
System Vision 2015, which explains that, in view of the global
27

See NPS Act §§ 4(2)(d)(i), 6 on clearing and sponsorship arrangements.
See also POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 4.
28
POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 4.
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crisis, a tightening of oversight is needed. Viewed from the
perspective of non-banks wanting to enter this market, the Position
Paper limits financial inclusion (access to the payment system) in
that the non-bank would have to enter into a sponsoring
arrangement with a bank, with consequent cost implications for
such non-bank. Furthermore, the high growth and penetration rates
of mobile telephony that is transforming cell phones into banks in
pockets of Africa is providing opportunities for countries on the
African continent to increase affordable and cost-effective means
of bringing the “unbanked” into the formal financial system. 29
With the requirement in the Position Paper that an issuer of emoney has to be a bank registered in South Africa, multiple
regulators are involved, namely the South African Reserve Bank
for regulation of banking and oversight of payments and the
telecommunications regulator for the regulation of the
telecommunications service provider. 30 The problem with multiple
regulators is that the possibility exists for regulatory arbitrage, that
is, that players would take advantage of regulatory lacunae.
Whilst the above legal and regulatory environment seems for
the most part sound, there are uncertainties as highlighted. It is
submitted that instead of focusing on e-money, the South African
Reserve Bank may want to consider issuing a Position Paper
dealing with all forms of emerging payment technologies in which
definitions can be stated clearly and any change in regulatory
stance explained with reference to other regulatory instruments. It
seems that due to the tightening of regulation, the trade-off is in
favor of risk management over financial inclusion (access to the
payment system). Klein and Mayer make a compelling argument
that what mobile banking illustrates in a stark form is the way in
29

See for example the success of M-PESA in Kenya. For more information,
see Carmen Nobel, Mobile Banking for the Unbanked, HARVARD BUS. SCH.
(June 13, 2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6729.html.
30
The Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 (S. Afr.) replaced the
former Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996 (S. Afr.). This Act aims to
converge broadcasting and telecommunications under one regulator. In South
Africa, telecommunications are regulated in terms of the Electronic
Communications Act. The main authority is the Independent Communications
Authority of South Africa, established by Section 3 of the Independent
Communications Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000 (S. Afr.).
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which payment systems can be disaggregated into component
services, namely exchange, storage, transfer and investment. In
their words: “Regulation should mirror this and be structured by
service rather than along traditional institutional lines, like a bank.
The question then is what type of regulation is appropriate for each
type of service.” 31
Okeahalam examines the NPS from an economic point of view
and argues that there may be a trade-off between widening of
access in the payment system and systemic risk. Whilst it is
difficult to be specific as to the exact cost of widening access, there
are financial, microeconomic, and actuarial methods for estimation
of risk and relating risk to the welfare benefits of the payment
system. 32 It is submitted that Okeahalam is correct in his argument
that different payment instruments present different sets of risk to
the payment system. It is submitted that a “stratified” regulatory
approach could be followed once an analysis has been done of the
risk presented by individual instruments, as opposed to the
individual institution, as is presently the case. This would mean
that the regulatory approach would then be stratified based on the
risks presented by the specific payment instrument. This is a
challenge which is presently not well researched in South Africa,
since the risks are determined based on the profile of the bank or
institution. It is further submitted that with the increasing
penetration level of mobile users in South Africa, research is
needed into the impact on access to the unbanked given the change
in regulatory stance of the South African Reserve Bank, lest a
golden opportunity is missed to broaden access to financial
services to the poor in South Africa.

31

See Michael Klein & Colin Mayer, Mobile Banking and Financial
Inclusion: The Regulatory Lessons 25 (The World Bank, Working Paper No.
5664,
2011),
available
at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/05/18/000158349_20110518143113/Rende
red/PDF/WPS5664.pdf.
32
Charles C. Okeahalam, Regulation of the Payments System of South
Africa, 4 J. INT’L BANKING REG. 338, 347-48 (2003).

330

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:3

IV. FINANCIAL INTEGRITY
This section deals with anti-money laundering (AML) and
combatting financing of terrorist (CFT) concerns as regulated in
South Africa. Other policy issues such as seigniorage, operation of
monetary policy, and consumer protection concerns fall outside of
the ambit of this Article.
A. South Africa
South Africa has criminalized money laundering in three
separate provisions of the 1998 Prevention of Organised Crime Act
(POCA), 33 which cover the conversion or transfer, concealment or
disguise, possession, and acquisition of property in a manner that is
largely consistent with the 1988 United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (Vienna Convention) and the 2000 U.N. Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention).
POCA provides for both criminal and civil forfeiture. The former
is based on conviction of the offender whereas the latter is not
dependent on conviction. 34
Terrorist financing is criminalized in South Africa in Section 4
of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist
and Related Activities Act (POCDATARA). 35 The POCDATARA
is comprehensive and criminalizes the collection or provision of
property with the intention that it be used for the purpose of
committing a terrorist act, or by a terrorist organization or
individual terrorist for any purpose.
Comprehensive AML/CFT preventative measures have been
33

Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.dac.gov.za/acts/Prevention%20of%20Organised%20Crime%20Act.
pdf.
34
For a comprehensive overview of the applicable legislation, see Louis de
Koker, Money Laundering in South Africa, in PROFILING MONEY LAUNDERING
IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 83 (Charles Goredema ed., 2003), available
at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono90.pdf.
35
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related
Activities Act 33 of 2004 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/
view/DownloadFileAction?id=67972.
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implemented in South Africa through the application of the 2001
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) 36 and the Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations (MLTFC
Regulations), read with various exemptions in terms of the
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Exemptions). The FICA has
since been amended in 2008 by the Financial Intelligence Centre
Amendment Act, which addressed, inter alia, some of the
supervisory concerns raised in the FATF mutual evaluation of
South Africa undertaken in 2008. 37 While the POCA is the primary
piece of legislation in terms of outlining activities that constitute
money laundering offences, it does not outline the measures to be
implemented to suppress and detect money laundering. Such is
provided for in the FICA 38 which is the principle piece of
legislation in terms of outlining AML measures.
What follows is a more detailed exposition of the specific
issues pertinent to this Article.
B. Analysis
South African AML and CFT laws primarily affect mobile
money via the customer due diligence (CDD) requirements that
they place upon financial institutions. The CDD measures of the
FICA and the POCDATARA are set out in the FICA, read with the
MLTFC Regulations. The nature of these CDD requisites and their
impact upon mobile money transactions are examined below.
1. Customer Identification and Verification
Section 21 of the FICA places an obligation upon “accountable
institutions” to establish as well as verify the identity of their
clients. The First Schedule of the Act outlines which institutions
36

Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68138
[hereinafter
FICA].
37
See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT:
SOUTH AFRICA (2009), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/mer/MER%20South%20Africa%20full.pdf.
38
FICA, supra note 36.
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are accountable institutions in terms of the Act and amongst those
listed are banks as well as money remitters. The FICA prohibits
these institutions from establishing a business relationship or
concluding a single transaction with a person unless they have
taken steps to:


Establish as well and verify the identity of the client; and



If the client is acting on behalf of another person, or
alternatively, if the person acts on behalf of the client, the
institution must establish and verify the identity of the other
person and their authority to act on behalf of the client, or
as the case may be, the client’s authority to act on behalf of
another person.

Should an accountable institution open an account or conclude
a single transaction (once-off) transaction without duly identifying
the client it commits an offence in terms of FICA. 39 The penalty
for such an offence is imprisonment for a maximum period of 15
years or a fine of ZAR100 million (US$12 million). 40
The MLTFC Regulations, which have to be read in conjunction
with the FICA, give more intrinsic details in regard to how
customer identification and verification of such is to be carried out
(promulgated by GN No. R1595 in GG No. 24176). The
Regulations state that, when establishing and verifying the identity
of a client, the following information must be obtained:


In the case of citizens, their full name, date of birth,
identification number, residential address, and tax
registration number. 41



In the case of foreigners, in addition to the ordinary
information that a citizen must provide, they are required to
give details in regard to their nationality as well as passport
number. 42

39

Id. at § 46.
Id. at § 68.
41
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Regulations, Reg. 3, in
Government Notice (GN) R1595/2002 4 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter MLTFC
Regulations].
42
Id. at 5 (Reg. 5).
40
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The FICA, in contrast to the Exchange Control Act and its
Regulations, does not put a duty on financial institutions to
determine whether their clients are legally present in South Africa.
Hence non-citizens are not required to provide details in regard to
their residence or work permit in order for financial institutions to
comply with the FICA provisions. 43
A person’s identity has to be verified by means of an
identification document. 44 In the case of South African citizens and
residents, an official national identity document would need to be
presented whereas foreigners have to present a passport. 45
Residential addresses are to be verified using documents such as a
utility bill. 46 Records in regard to, amongst other information, a
client’s identity, as well as transaction amounts, must be kept for a
period of five years from the date that the business relationship is
established or transaction is concluded. 47
The regulator was mindful of the fact that the need to present
an identity document could prevent individuals without such a
document from accessing formal financial services and hence
created room for exclusion. The MLTFC Regulations therefore
allow financial institutions, in circumstances were it is deemed to
be reasonably acceptable for a person to be unable to provide an
identity document, to rely on another document issued to that
person that bears the following:


A photograph of the person;



The person’s full name or initials and surname;



The person’s date of birth; and

43

Hennie Bester et al., Reviewing the Policy Framework for Money
Transfers 18 (FinMark Trust & CENFRI, 2010), available at http://cenfri.org/
documents/Remittances/2010/Regulatory%20framework%20for%20money%20
transfers_South%20Africa_discussion%20doc_250110.pdf.
44
MLTFC Regulations, supra note 41, at 4-5 (Reg. 4), 6 (Reg. 6).
45
An identity document is defined in Regulation 1. Id. at 3.
46
Hennie Bester et al., Implementing FATF Standards in Developing
Countries and Financial Inclusion: Findings and Guidelines 10-11 (World Bank
First Initiative, Final Report, 2008), available at http://www.cenfri.org/
documents/AML/AML_CFT%20and%20Financial%20Inclusion.pdf.
47
FICA §§ 22-23.
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The person’s identity number. 48

Examples of documents that can be accepted as an alternative
form of verification in exceptional circumstances are a valid South
African driver’s license or passport as well as a valid temporary
identity document issued by the Department of Home Affairs. 49
The latter documents should be valid in the sense that they must be
current and unexpired.
This exemption is, however, not applicable to individuals who
are not South African citizens or residents, as no mention of such
is made within the Regulations. If the Regulations are strictly
implemented, migrants who have neither a passport nor valid travel
document in their possession would be unable to access formal
remittance services. It is submitted, however, that even if the
exception were applicable to foreigners it would likely be of little
effect taking into account that studies show that financial
institutions such as banks have been hesitant to exercise the
discretion bestowed upon them by Regulation 6. 50 The
conservative approach has been attributed to the significant fines
that are associated with money laundering offences. 51
48

MLTFC Regulations, supra note 41, at 4-5 (Reg. 4(a)(ii)).
Fin. Intelligence Centre Guidance Note 3, Government Notice (GN)
R715/2005
(S.
Afr.),
available
at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/
DownloadFileAction?id=61267 [hereinafter FIC Guidance Note]; ABSA Bank,
Establishing and Managing Business Relationships – Customer Identification
and Verification, Compliance Document: FICA (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.absa.co.za/deployedfiles/Absa.co.za/PDF%27s/About%20Absa/Abs
a%20Group/Compliance%20Documents/Financial%20Intelligence%20Centre%
20Act.pdf.
50
For more detail on financial inclusion, see Louis de Koker & John
Symington, Conservative Compliance Behaviour (FinMark Trust, 2011),
available
at
http://www.cenfri.org/k2/item/95-conservative-compliancebehaviour-2011. This study is the most recent study which also highlights trends
in bank behaviour. See also CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR [CGAP]
& THE WORLD BANK, FINANCIAL ACCESS 2010: THE STATE OF FINANCIAL
INCLUSION THROUGH THE CRISIS (2010), available at http://www.cgap.org/
gm/document-1.9.46570/FA_2010_Financial_Access_2010_Rev.pdf; GPFI &
INT’L FIN. CORP., FINANCIAL INCLUSION DATA: ASSESSING THE LANDSCAPE AND
COUNTRY-LEVEL
TARGET
APPROACHES
(2011),
available
at
http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/WORKINGDATA.pdf.
51
Bester et al., supra note 46, at 144.
49
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Ideally the information gathered in identifying a client should
enable a financial institution to form a client profile. According to
de Koker, many South African institutions are unable to form an
individual comprehensive client profile for general financial
service customers that would support effective AML/CFT
monitoring for unusual activity. 52 This is due to the fact that under
ordinary circumstances financial institutions are only obliged to
obtain information that pertains to the personal identity of the
client. Such particulars only play a small role in building a client
profile and are insufficient to enable a financial institution to
effectively detect suspicious financial activity by a client.
For a client profile to effectively be established, information
such as the source of the client’s income would be needed.
Financial institutions are only obliged to obtain such information
in the case of business relationships or transactions that present a
high risk of facilitating money-laundering activities. 53
In circumstances where a business relationship or once-off
transaction presents a high risk of facilitating money laundering or
where it is necessary for a financial institution to identify the
proceeds of unlawful activity or money laundering, inter alia, the
following must be ascertained:


The source of the client’s income; and



The source of the funds which the client intends to use to
conclude the transaction or series of transactions in the
course of a business relationship.

Professor de Koker states that the procedure prescribed by the
current Regulation 21 is essentially a “Know Your Customer” or
CDD procedure, in contrast to the ordinary procedure of
identifying clients which is merely a “Client Identification and
Verification” procedure . 54

52

Louis de Koker, Client Identification and Money Laundering Control:
Perspectives on the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, 4 J. OF S. AFR.
L. 715, 723 (2004).
53
MLTFC Regulations, supra note 41, at 15 (Reg. 21).
54
de Koker, supra note 52, at 724.
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2. The Provision and Verification of a Residential Address
The obligation to provide an address and the need for such to
be verified appears to have been the chosen safeguard against
identity fraud. The value of providing a residential address for
purposes of identifying a customer has been questioned. It is
argued that such a requirement may be more useful in developed
countries without a system of national identity numbers, but with
rich sources of data on their residents. 55 In such countries,
addresses are helpful to distinguish between different people with
similar names, but are less functional in countries with
comprehensive national identification systems. Once an
accountable institution obtains a client’s name, date of birth, and
unique national identity number, there is no need for it to obtain a
residential address. Requiring address verification under these
conditions does not add significant identification value, but causes
undue hardship for customers who often lack formal addresses.
Professor de Koker argues that the negative impact of
residential address verification increases as a result of the high
level of internal migration in South Africa. 56 Such arguments
become relevant when one considers the practical difficulties that
have been experienced in South Africa in verifying the residential
addresses of individuals.
In South Africa, the verification of a client’s address has
presented certain difficulties, particularly with low-income
individuals. 57 The drafters of the FICA and its Regulations were
aware of the fact that individuals who lived in informal settlements
and rural areas could face problems in verifying their residential
address in accordance with the regulatory requisites. 58 As a
consequence, room for exception from the need to provide a
residential address was created by means of “Exemption 17.” The

55

Id. at 742.
Id.
57
Bester et al., supra note 43, at 18.
58
Louis de Koker, The Money Laundering Risk Posed by Low-Risk
Financial Products in South Africa: Findings and Guidelines, 12 J. MONEY
LAUNDERING CONTROL 323, 325 (2009).
56
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latter is contained within the Schedule to the MLTFC
Regulations. 59
3. Enhancing Financial Inclusion: Exemption 17 and Mobile
Money
Exemption 17 relieves certain financial institutions from the
general obligation placed upon them by Section 21 of the FICA,
which requires them to attain as well as verify their customer’s
residential address. The exemption is only applicable if certain
requirements are fulfilled. Exemption 17 was included in the
original set of Exemptions, but it proved of little value in practice
as the requirements were too rigid and could not be met by many
unbanked persons. Exemption 17 was therefore revised in 2004. 60
The amendments were informed by actual market research and
take the needs of the financially excluded into account. 61
According to Isern and de Koker, this framework allows “financial
institutions to verify a person’s identity using the national ID
document without having to verify the person’s residential address
if the financial product meets a certain balance limit (US$3,000)
and transaction restrictions (US$600 per day).” 62
The amended Exemption 17 facilitated the launch of the
Mzansi account 63 that has reportedly brought over 6 million people
into the formal financial sector. 64
59

Exemptions in Terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001,
Exemption 17, Government Notice (GN) R1596/2002 9-10 (S. Afr.).
60
Exemption in Terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001,
Government Notice (GN) R1353/2004 (S. Afr.), available at
https://www.fic.gov.za/DownloadContent/RESOURCES/GUIDELINES/10.Rev
ised%20exemption.pdf [hereinafter FICA Exemption 17].
61
de Koker, supra note 52, at 729; Hennie Bester et al., Legislative and
Regulatory Obstacles to Mass Banking 65-66 (Genesis Analytics, 2003),
available
at
http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30016861/dekokerlegislativeandregulatory-2003.pdf.
62
Jennifer Isern & Louis de Koker, AML/CFT: Strengthening Financial
Inclusion and Integrity 10-11 (CGAP, Focus Note No. 56, 2009), available at
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.37862/FN56.pdf.
63
The Mzansi account is a savings account with basic transaction capability
aimed at the low-income market.
64
See the data in BANKABLE FRONTIER ASSOC., THE MZANSI BANK
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The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) has, in addition, issued
guidance notes as contemplated in Section 4(c) of the FICA, which
provide guidance to banks in regard to which documents qualify as
acceptable verification documentation. In establishing and
verifying customer identity, banks are encouraged to undertake a
“risk based approach” as opposed to following a “one size fits all
approach.” 65
Exemption 17 also enabled the creation of a simplified CDD
framework for mobile money. The Banks Act Guidance Note of
2008 issued by the Registrar of Banks brought mobile banking
products within the framework of Exemption 17. The product is
offered to clients via a non-face-to-face process, which must be
followed only on the basis of the minimum set of criteria being
met. Importantly, however, a lower daily transaction limit of
ZAR1,000 (US$120) per day is set. 66 If a client wishes to exceed
this limit, the normal verification procedures would have to be
followed. Finally, the Guidance Note states that the “expansion of
banking services should not happen to the detriment of control
measures that are aimed at facilitating the detection and
investigation, or even the prevention, of money laundering and
terrorist financing through banks.” 67
It is submitted that the relief granted by Exemption 17, even in
its amended form, is only partially effective in achieving the
desired effect of increasing financial inclusion. This is taking into
account that the exemption only provides room for exception in
regard to the ascertainment of a client’s residential address; it does
not absolve individuals from presenting an identity document. In
addition to the latter, the exemption does not apply to cross-border
ACCOUNT INITIATIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA 3 (2009), available at
http://www.gatewaytosavings.org/cmsdocuments/MzansiProject-FINAL_
REPORT_March202009.pdf.
65
FIC Guidance Note, supra note 49. For more detail on the risk-based
approach, see also de Koker, supra note 58.
66
Banks Act Guidance Note 6/2008 from E.M. Kruger, Office of the
Registrar of Banks, to All Banks, Controlling Companies and Branches of
Foreign Banks, at 2 (May 7, 2008), available at http://www.cgap.org/
gm/document-1.1.6005/SARB%20Guidance%20Note%206%20of%20on%
202008%20Cell-Phone%20Banking.pdf.
67
Id.

2013]

MOBILE MONEY, FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND
FINANCIAL INTEGRITY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE

339

transactions that go beyond the Common Monetary Area (CMA),
comprised of South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. 68
Transactions that go beyond the CMA are still subject to the
stringent CDD requisites imposed by FICA. Furthermore, the
exemption only applies to certain accountable institutions and not
all of them. Mobile money transfer businesses, unlike banking
institutions, have not been included within the scope of the
exemption.
Asylum seekers have been dealt a major blow by the May 2010
FIC advisory issued to banks that banks are not allowed to transact
with asylum seekers based on the official certificates and permits
issued by the South African government. This means that an
asylum seeker is barred from opening a bank account and
conducting transactions until the application for asylum is
processed, asylum was granted and the refugee was issued with a
more formal maroon South African refugee document. Before the
issuing of the interpretation, they were allowed to rely on the
permits and licenses to open accounts. Since the interpretation was
issued, asylum seekers have reported that banks have also refused
them permission to withdraw their funds from the accounts that
they have previously opened, causing severe personal hardship. 69
Not only was the FIC advisory ineffective communication, it was
also confrontational and upset a practice which banks have adopted
as early as 2003.
A compromise has since been reached following litigation
challenging the position of the FIC allowing banks to accept
asylum documentation to verify identify only after verifying the
authenticity of the document with the South African Department of
Home Affairs. 70
68

FICA Exemption 17, supra note 60, at 6.
See FATF, FATF GUIDANCE ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011), available
at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/AML%20CFT%
20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf.
70
For more information on the debacle, see Tatenda Gumbo, S. African
Court Restores Access to Bank Accounts by Refugees and Asylum Seekers,
VOICE OF AMERICA ZIMBABWE (June 8, 2012), http://www.voazimbabwe.com/
content/south-acrican-court-restores-bank-access-for-refugees107057558/1459047.html.
69
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Despite the compromise, the hardship for undocumented
migrants deepened when they lost their access to mobile
communication in South Africa. The Regulation of Interception of
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related
Information Act (RICA) 71 of 2002 introduced customer
identification and verification measures that are very similar to the
FICA CDD requirements. Users have to verify their identities
using official documentation to access mobile communication
services. Foreigners without passports are generally not able to
legally gain normal access to South African-issued mobile phones.
They are therefore faced with mobile money access barriers
created by RICA as well as FICA. A recent report stated:
Refugees are vulnerable to the high levels of
random crime that afflict South Africa, as well as
sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation in
the workplace and detention due to lack of proper
documentation. Poor socio-economic conditions
among host communities provide a breeding ground
for xenophobia. Documents of limited validity
compromise refugees’ efforts to become self-reliant
by making it hard for them to hold long-term jobs,
while at the same time a law allowing refugees and
asylum-seekers to have bank accounts is not being
fully implemented. 72
The fact that a passport must be presented effectively bars
undocumented migrants who do not have valid travel documents
from accessing formal remittance services. Migrants who live in
informal settlements 73 are also barred from accessing formal
remittance channels as they are unable to fulfill the address
71

Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.internet.org.za/ricpci.html.
72
See South Africa, THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/49e485aa6.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2012).
73
HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, CITIZENSHIP, VIOLENCE AND
XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: PERCEPTIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICAN
COMMUNITIES 16 (2008); Glenn Ashton, Xenophobia Redux, S. AFR. CIVIL
SOCIETY INFO. SERV. (July 7, 2010), http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/510.1.
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verification requisite imposed by FICA. In view of the above, it is
submitted that regulators should give more thought in making
policy that would align AML/CFT, financial inclusion, the
regulation of telecommunications service providers who offer
mobile money services, as well as South Africa’s international
obligations to alleviate the plight of refugees.
In his Article on the 2012 FATF Standards, de Koker notes that
the risk-based approach is now mandatory for countries and
institutions and that the cornerstone of the risk-based approach is
risk assessment. It is interesting to note that South Africa has to
some extent followed a risk-based approach, but to date no formal
risk assessment has taken place. The current CDD requirements,
for example, were based on the previous FATF Recommendations.
Regulation 21, for example, was based on the predecessor of 2003
Recommendation 5, which has now, in turn, been replaced by
Recommendation 10. In effect this would mean that South Africa
would have to conduct a formal risk assessment and in a sense
conduct a “gap analysis” of the current CDD requirements as
contained in the FICA and regulations thereto and match this
against the new 2012 FATF Standards. Furthermore, lower-risk
and higher-risk scenarios would have to be determined. Should the
risk assessment show that mobile money is considered a “lower
risk” product, the effect would be that the limits imposed would
have to be commensurate with the risk identified, i.e. the lower the
risk, the more simplified the measures should be. It would be
interesting to see how this would be done in South Africa, where,
as stated earlier, even though a “risk-based approach” was
followed in the past, a formal risk assessment would now have to
take place. It is hoped that in the formal risk assessment, a more
equitable system would be employed as far as migrant workers
who come from outside the CMA are concerned. 74 This would
74

For example, mobile money could be regarded as “financial products or
services that provide appropriately defined and limited services to certain types
of customers, so as to increase access for financial inclusion purposes.” FATF,
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
64 (2012), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%20(approved%20Februar
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mean that regulators would have to show more faith in refugees
and asylum seekers in amending Exemption 17, which remains to
be seen. 75
Even if the AML barriers are removed, refugees and asylum
seekers are still faced with the barriers imposed by RICA. 76 In
effect this would mean that if a risk assessment is made for South
Africa and a distinction is made between low-risk and high-risk
scenarios, RICA would likewise have to be amended to allow for
greater financial inclusion in line with the risk-based approach to
be followed and formalised through the formal risk assessment.
4. Cross-Border Networking
If one is to take a look at the effects of AML measures upon
the remittance industry from a wider perspective the FATF
Standards become relevant. The 2012 FATF Standards deal with
correspondent banking relationships in Regulation 13. Financial
institutions that are involved in correspondent banking
relationships must gather information about their counterparty’s
business, which includes their AML and CFT supervision,
investigation and regulatory action, and their AML/CFT controls.
Furthermore, these financial institutions should obtain approvals
from senior management before establishing new correspondent
banking relationships; they must clearly understand the respective
responsibilities of each institution and be satisfied that the
respondent bank has conducted CDD on its customers who have
direct access to accounts of the correspondent bank.
New Recommendation 14 provides that countries should take
measures to ensure that natural or legal persons who provide
y%202012)%20reprint%20May%202012%20web%20version.pdf. For more
detail, see Louis de Koker, The 2012 Revised FATF Recommendations:
Assessing and Mitigating Mobile Money Integrity Risks Within the New
Standards Framework, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 165, 175 (2013).
75
For more detail see de Koker, supra note 58, at 328.
76
See Louis de Koker, Will RICA’s Customer Identification Data Meet
Anti-Money Laundering Requirements and Facilitate the Development of
Transformational Mobile Banking in South Africa? (FinMark Trust, Exploratory
Note, 2010), available at http://www.cenfri.org/documents/Financial%
20inclusion/2010/RICA%20impact%20on%20financial%20inclusion_final.pdf.

2013]

MOBILE MONEY, FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND
FINANCIAL INTEGRITY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE

343

money or money value transfer services are licensed or registered
and subject to effective systems for monitoring and compliance
with the relevant measures called for in the FATF
Recommendations. South Africa would need to ensure that this is
accommodated for in its legal framework.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Policy makers may need to consider some potentially new
challenges posed by technological innovation and other changes in
the payment system more generally as well as how these impact
regulatory approaches with respect to AML/CFT. For instance,
mobile money products in some countries may be offered by
entities other than institutions subject to banking supervision,
although many countries apply anti-money laundering laws to all
institutions.
The extent of CFT/AML regulation should depend on the
relative attractiveness for money launderers and risk posed by such
a scheme. In other words, if a risk-based approached is followed,
the level of regulation would be relative to the risk introduced by
such system. It is recommended that a stratified approach to
regulation of m-money be followed, viewed from a risk-based
AML/CFT perspective.
The following factors could be taken into consideration to
arrive at such a stratified approach based on the service rather than
the institution:
 Semi-open systems – A limited form of regulation could be
applicable. Issuers could be licensed as M-Money Issuers
similar to the EU or U.K. position or Authorized
Institutions similar to the Hong Kong position. One of the
conditions could be to place a limit on the value on the card
similar to the U.K. position.


Open loop systems – In consultation with the SARB on
oversight and supervisory issues, open loop systems would
be regulated by the SARB in terms of its E-money Position
Paper which restricts such systems to banks. However,
from an AML/CFT perspective, the FIC could add
provisions in the Regulations which would state that
reporting on m-money products have to be done as part of
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such bank’s obligations as an accountable institution in
terms of FICA and the Regulations.
The relief granted by Exemption 17, as mentioned previously,
is only partially effective in facilitating greater financial inclusion.
The view is taken bearing into account that Exemption 17 is not
applicable to certain mobile money transfers, namely remittance
transactions that go beyond the CMA, 77 nor does it apply to
financial institutions that provide mobile money transfers
(remittance services) as their only business. 78 Hence, migrant
laborers who live in informal settlements face a significant barrier
in accessing formal remittance services as they are likely to face
significant difficulty in verifying their residential address. An
amendment of Exemption 17 is thus needed if the trade-off has to
be in favor of financial inclusion. It is always difficult to balance
financial integrity on one hand and the concern of financial
inclusion on the other. South Africa would have to conduct a
formal risk assessment in accordance with the mandatory riskbased approach advocated in the 2012 FATF Standards. This
means that there is an opportunity to align the South African legal
framework with the 2012 FATF Standards and hopefully, also
amend Exemption 17 to be more inclusive, depending of course on
the outcome of the formal risk assessment of course. This would
also mean that the obstacles imposed by RICA be revisited in light
of the formal risk assessment mandated by the 2012 FATF
Recommendations.
CONCLUSION
This Article gives an overview of the legal and regulatory
framework for mobile payments in South Africa. While the legal
and regulatory framework is, for the most part, sound, the Article
identifies risks, challenges, and uncertainties that regulators may
take into account. The analysis also examines the significance of
the South African Reserve Bank’s 2009 Position Paper on
Electronic Money, the reasons for the change in regulatory stance,
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and the effect that this may have on financial inclusion (access to
the payment system) for non-bank mobile payment providers.
Continued research in this area is needed to assess the impact of
the change in regulatory stance on access to financial services for
the poor, as a golden opportunity may be missed to increase
financial inclusion to the payment system if it is found that there is
over-regulation of mobile payments in South Africa. What may be
needed is a stratified regulatory approach, that is, that regulation be
structured by service rather than along traditional lines and that the
focus should be on what type of regulation would be appropriate
for which type of payment. The opportunity now arises to address
this through a formal risk assessment, as mandated by the 2012
FATF Standards, as well as an amendment to RICA to remove the
obstacles for refugees and asylum seekers. If this is not done
properly, the clear benefits of mobile money as shown in Kenya
may not be realized in South Africa.
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